In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties' degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table.
INTRODUCTION
In a typical tort case one party, the injurer, has harmed another party, the victim. If it is an accidental tort (rather than an intentional one), the harm is the result of an accident, a random event whose chance of occurring, or probability, depends on the amounts of care taken by one or both parties. The victim's harm is measured in terms of money damages. This measurement might be easy (how much to repair that car?) or difficult (how much to compensate for that death?). Tort law commonly sets a standard of care, or an amount of care to be taken by a party which is legally sufficient: If a party takes that much care or more she has met the standard and is non-negligent, but if she takes less care, she is negligent. A tort liability rule specifies how the money damages should be split between victim and injurer. A negligence-based liability rule splits the damages in a way that generally depends on the negligence or non-negligence of the injurer and the victim. Commonly-used negligence-based liability rules include simple negligence (all damages fall on the injurer if she negligent, otherwise on the victim), negligence with a defense of contributory negligence (all damages fall on the injurer if she is negligent and the victim is non-negligent, otherwise on the victim), and negligence with a defense of comparative negligence (all damages fall on the injurer if she is negligent and the victim is not, are split between them according to degree of fault if both are negligent, and fall on the victim otherwise).
All the standard rules share these properties: (A) When one party is negligent and the other is not, the negligent party bears all the accident loss.
(B) When both parties are non-negligent, the liability shares do not depend on the degrees of "vigilance" shown by the parties, that is, the care levels above and beyond what is efficient.
(C) When both parties are non-negligent, all the accident loss falls on just one party. 1 See the modeling of liability rules in Brown (1973) , Diamond (1974) , Polinsky (1989) , Landes and Posner (1987) , Shavell (1987) , Barnes and Stout (1992) , Posner (1992) , Levmore (1994) , Kaplow (1995) , Biggar (1995) , Miceli (1997) , Cooter and Ulen (1997) , Feldman and Frost (1998) , Jain and Singh (2002) , Kim (2004) , Kim and Feldman (2006) , and Singh (2007) , among others.
In this paper we will describe a new liability rule which drops properties A, B and C.
This new rule treats victim and injurer symmetrically when both are negligent, as does any rule incorporating the doctrine of comparative negligence, which splits damages according to degree of fault (or degree of negligence). But it also treats them symmetrically when both are non-negligent, splitting the damages according to their degrees of vigilance. Moreover, the logic of the rule is exactly the same when both parties are negligent and when both parties are non-negligent. For these reasons we call our new rule the super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule, or the super-symmetric rule for short. 2 There are several reasons why we want to drop these properties. First consider property A. Consider auto accidents, assume the single care dimension is vehicle speed, and suppose the standard of care is set at the speed limit of 50 mph. Suppose a collision of 2 vehicles results in $10,000 in damages to the victim. Then if the victim is going exactly 50 mph (and just meeting the standard of care) and the injurer is going 51 mph (slightly too fast), all damages fall on the injurer. But now suppose the injurer is going 100 mph. If an accident occurs she is treated exactly the same way (paying $10,000 in damages) as she would be if she had been going 51 mph. Of course accidents may be more probable at the higher speed, and damages may be greater, all of which the injurer may consider. But our point is this: if the victim is meeting her care standard, the legal treatment of the injurer is the same whether she is slightly negligent, or grossly negligent. Similarly, suppose the injurer is going 51 mph (slightly too fast), and the victim is considering whether to drive 50 mph (just meeting the standard) or 35 mph (being very careful). Under property A, the consequences for injurer and victim are the same in either scenario. If the injurer is failing to meet her standard, the legal treatment of the two parties is the same whether the victim is just meeting her standard, or being exceptionally careful.
So property A implies that over large ranges of care and/or carelessness, a liability rule is entirely unresponsive to changes in care level, neither rewarding additional care nor penalizing additional carelessness. Moreover, although property A makes the liability rule broadly unresponsive, it simultaneously makes it too responsive at one critical point. What we mean is apparent from the speeding example: If the injurer is going 51 mph and the victim is going 50 mph, all the damages fall on the injurer. If the injurer slows down very slightly, to 50 mph, 2 See Feldman and Singh (2008) for an extensive mathematical analysis of the super-symmetric rule. and the victim speeds up very slightly, to 51 mph, there is an abrupt shift in liability: suddenly all the damages fall on the victim. Such an abrupt change in liability assignments is a mathematical discontinuity, and property A requires a discontinuity at the crucial point where victim and injurer are just meeting their standards of care.
When both injurer and victim are negligent, the traditional rule of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence gives the injurer a free pass: all the damages stay with the victim. This creates an obvious inequity. In terms of the speeding example, if both victim and injurer are driving 51 mph in the 50 mph zone, contributory negligence puts all of the damages on the victim. In contrast, the more modern rule of negligence with a defense of comparative negligence splits the damages according to degree of fault, or degree of negligence. For the purposes of economic analysis, degree of negligence it is most naturally defined, for the injurer, as the injurer's amount of carelessness divided by the total amounts of carelessness of the two parties, with an analogous definition for the victim. In the speeding example, it would be easiest to calculate the degrees of negligence as 1 mph / (1 mph + 1 mph) = ½ for each party, and comparative negligence would then split the damages equally. On the other hand, if the speeds were 51 mph for the victim and 59 mph for the injurer, the rule would put 9/10 of the damages on the injurer and 1/10 on the victim. So comparative negligence is appealing for its equitable treatment of victim and injurer when both are negligent, each is penalized based on the relative degree of her carelessness.
But property C implies there is no splitting of damages when both parties are nonnegligent, and property B implies that the liability assignment when both are non-negligent must be entirely unresponsive to the parties' degrees of care. For instance, under the rule of negligence with comparative negligence as a defense, whether the injurer is driving at 50 mph (just meeting the standard) and the victim is driving at 35 mph (being very careful), or vice versa, all damages fall on the victim. The inequity is clear: negligence with comparative negligence as a defense produces equitable outcomes when both are negligent, but not when both are non-negligent. This paper builds on the work of many authors. 3 In particular, Calabresi and Cooper However, as we shall show below, efficiency can be had without these 3 properties.
In this paper we discuss a new liability rule, super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance, that drops properties A, B and C. When one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, the rule provides for variable liability shares that respond to degrees of carefulness or carelessness of the two parties. When both parties are negligent, the rule provides for liability shares that depend on degrees of negligence of the two parties, as per comparative negligence, but when both parties are non-negligent the rule also provides for variable liability shares that depend on the degrees of vigilance of the two parties. The rule is equitable, the rule has no discontinuity at the point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care, and the rule results in the choice of efficient care levels by the two parties.
This paper is meant to be relatively non-mathematical. Our rigorous mathematical results are laid our elsewhere (Feldman & Singh (2008) ). Here we try to minimize notation, and we rely on one simple example to explain the new liability rule as well as other related rules. In section 2 we define most of our terms, lay out our example, and discuss the doctrines 3 Calabresi (1965) noted that fault based liability rules ignore the value of deterring faultless accidents. For criticism of the modeling of liability rules on various grounds, including properties B and C, see Grady (1989) , Kahan (1989) , Marks (1994) , Burrows (1999) and Wright (2002) . See Marks (1994) and Miceli (1996) for commentary on Grady (1989 Parties X and Y can spend money to reduce the likelihood of accidents. If an accident occurs, a court will measure each party's care by looking at the money she has spent (rather than by looking at her vehicle speed, as in the example of section 1). Let x and y represent the care expenditures of X and Y. We let represent the probability of an accident, which depends on the care levels of the two people. The average, or expected, accident loss is . We assume the parties are risk neutral; this means they only consider expected losses, and do not consider other statistical properties of risk such as standard deviations.
Total social cost (TSC) is defined as the sum of care-taking costs of both parties and expected accident costs. That is, ( , ) TSC x y p x y L = + + . We let represent the combination of care levels which minimizes total social cost. We assume this care combination is unique. Efficiency means minimizing total social cost, and so we call the efficient care combination.
If an accident occurs, the victim takes the injurer to court. Victim, injurer and court are all assumed to have full information about care levels, the accident probability function, the loss L, and the expected loss. All know * x and * y . The court sets a standard of care for each of the parties. If a party's care level falls below that standard, she is negligent; if the care level is greater than or equal to the standard, she is non-negligent. If she takes more care than the standard, she is vigilant. We make the standard assumption that, for each party, the court sets the standard of care at the efficiency level. 5 That is, party X is negligent if , and she is non-negligent if Under pure comparative negligence, the larger a party's degree of negligence, the larger is the fraction of the loss the court puts on her. Obviously we don't want to have a party's larger degree of vigilance to result in a larger fraction of the loss on that party. We want the opposite. The straightforward way to do this is to allocate losses, when both are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant, by setting party Y's fraction of the loss equal to party X's degree of vigilance, and vice versa. (That is, X's degree of vigilance becomes Y's share, and vice versa.)
We will call a liability rule that does this in the both parties non-negligent domain a pure comparative vigilance rule.
6 6 The reader may question the wisdom of a rule that rewards care in excess of the efficient level. But care, whether at a less-than-efficient or greater-than-efficient level, is always a "good" rather than a "bad," since it reduces accident probabilities and expected losses. It is beneficial to the person making the expenditure, and it is also beneficial to the other person. Our view is that if it makes sense to reward additional care in domain 3, as comparative negligence does, then it makes sense to reward additional care in the other domains as well.
We can now turn to our simple example. In this example, each party can spend 0, 1, or 2 on care (in dollars or other currency units). That is, we have 3 discrete care levels that can be used by X and Y. Each pair of care levels ( , ) x y produces some accident probability and some expected loss . In the tables below we suppress the probability function and only show the expected losses. The example will be presented in a series of almost-selfexplanatory tables. Table 1 simply shows expected losses contingent on the care levels. Table   2 shows total social cost in each cell, found by adding together the expected loss and the sum of the corresponding care amounts. It is clear from table 2 that the efficient pair of care levels is . Whatever legal rule may be used, the goal is to induce the two parties to get to the efficient combination of care levels. Note that the efficient point is (1,1). Next we will use our tables to analyze pure comparative negligence plus vigilance. In particular, consider a liability rule that (a) places all damages on the negligent party when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent (property A), (b) uses pure comparative negligence when both parties are negligent, and (c) uses pure comparative vigilance when both parties are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant. We need to also specify the loss allocation at the efficient point (1,1). We will assume: (d) the losses at the efficient point all fall on the victim (as with a standard negligence rule, rather than a strict liability rule). These new assumptions require that we go back to X's Care:
The pair (x,y) = (1,1) is efficient. However the unique Nash equilibrium is at (2,2). Table 9 provides important results: Adding pure comparative vigilance in the straightforward way to pure comparative negligence produces a liability rule that does not work. That is, the efficient point may not be a Nash equilibrium, and there may be an inefficient combination of care levels that is a Nash equilibrium.
THE SUPER-SYMMETRIC RULE
We now describe the super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule. It works as follows:
(a) At the efficient point , the liability rule will assign a specific share of ( , ) ( , ) p x y p x y > (i.e., the accident probability is too high), and so the ratio is less than 1. In domain 1, if both parties are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant, then * Second, these increments vary; and as the non-negligent party increases her vigilance, the incremental burdens on both parties fall. 
CONCLUSIONS
Various legal scholars have suggested an equitable division of liability between the parties when both injurer and victim are non-negligent, similar to the comparative negligence division when both are negligent. We have shown in this paper that such a division will not work if it is based on a naïve conjunction of pure comparative negligence and pure comparative vigilance.
However, if done in a subtle way, comparative vigilance can be combined with comparative negligence; in fact they can be combined in a way that makes them perfectly symmetric.
For standard liability rules, if one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, all liability falls on the negligent party, no matter how careless the negligent party or how careful the non-negligent party. We think this is a crude property, which our super-symmetric rule does not share. Under the super-symmetric rule, liability shares vary as the two parties vary their care levels, even when they remain in domain 2 (X negligent, Y not) or in domain 4 (Y negligent, X not). And when one party is negligent and the other is not, increased carelessness by the negligent party is penalized with a higher liability share, and increased care by the nonnegligent party is rewarded with a lower liability share.
Some scholars have observed that the discontinuous shift in liability shares at the efficient point under standard rules is discomforting. It is obviously not possible to rigorously discuss continuity and discontinuity in the context of a discrete example. burdens on the parties under the super-symmetric rule. The former shows a discontinuity in burdens (look at the burdens on X, as she shifts between 0 x = and 1 x = ), and the latter shows no such discontinuity.
Finally, our super-symmetric rule, which uses exactly the same logic in the both-vigilant domain as in the both-negligent domain, which provides for varying liability shares within each of the one-party-negligent and other-party-non-negligent domains, and which avoids abrupt jumps in liability shares and burdens, succeeds in providing the proper incentives to the two parties, incentives which should induce them to find the point which minimizes total social costs.
